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COMMENTS
A CHALLENGE TO THE VALIDITY OF CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF WISCONSIN'S CHAPTER 128
INTRODUCTION
Conflicts of legislative authority are an inherent consequence of a
federal system of government. An aspect of one of the conflicts stem-
ming from this dichotomy of legislative power is a legal struggle in the
area of the debtor-creditor relationship. The center of the dispute in
this area is a controversy concerning the power of a state legislature
to pass laws with respect to the debtor-creditor relationship when Con-
gress has enacted a bankruptcy act. The enactment of a national bank-
ruptcy law by Congress extinquishes the power of the state to legislate
in the area covered by the act. To what extent a bankruptcy act re-
stricts the state's power to provide remedies to creditors and debtors
is not completely settled. However, a line of judicial decisions extend-
ing over a century and a half has established certain principles which
confine the state's power over these matters. When a state statute is in
question, these principles are applied in the determination of whether
the legislature has transgressed the limitations which have been placed
upon it.
The Wisconsin Legislature, as the legislatures of other states, is
involved in the struggle of trying to retain control over certain areas
of the debtor-creditor relationship without running afoul of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.' However, in 1956 Judge Swaim of the Seventh Circuit
discovered that the Wisconsin Legislature had exceeded its powers with
respect to certain provisions of Chapter 128 of the 1951 Statutes.2 One
year later, the Wisconsin Legislature amended Chapter 128 in an at-
tempt to eradicate those provisions which had been held to be inopera-
tive due to the existence of the Bankruptcy Act.3 In order not to relin-
quish control over the debtor-creditor relationship in this particular area,
the Legislature has afforded a different remedy to creditors in place
of the deleted one. Viewing this substituted statutory remedy in the
light of past judicial decisions, a determination can be made that the
same fate will befall it that occurred to the former one.
A conclusive determination as to what constitutes a conflict between
the bankruptcy act and a statute of a state has not been formulated
despite the many decisions on the subject. Therefore, to ascertain
'30 Stat. 544 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §§1-1255 (1958). Hereafter it is cited as The
Bankruptcy Act.2 In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., 239 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), reversing,
136 F.Supp. 439 (E.D. Wis. 1955).
3 Wis. LAws 1957, ch. 274, §§2-6.
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whether the Wisconsin provisions run contrary to the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act, a brief review of the history of bankruptcy laws in
the United States and an examination of the National Bankruptcy Act
and its interpretations are necessary.
An accurate determination of the doubtful provisions of the Wis-
consin Statute is best served by analyzing them and by fitting their vari-
ous features into the existing pattern of case law. But since the numer-
ous features are dependent upon each other and form one remedy, they
shall also be considered as a whole. In both instances, the questionable
provisions will be contrasted to the limitations which, by the course of
judicial decisions, have been placed upon the state's power to legislate
in the area of the debtor-creditor relationship.
Although it has yet to be established by any court that the Wisconsin
Statute is in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act, if there be a determination
that the Statute is suspended, it shall be incumbent upon the Legislature
to again amend Chapter 128. Consequently, an incidental purpose of
this article is to propose certain recommendations which will place the
Wisconsin Statute in harmony with the Bankruptcy Act.
THE EFFECT OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT ON STATE STATUTES
A preliminary condensation of the legal theory derived from a mul-
titude of judicial decisions shall serve as a frame of reference in the
discussion of the Wisconsin Statute. The purpose of this legal frame-
work is to place in proper perspective the various arguments proposed
against the validity of the Statute.
A state's power to enact laws concerning the debtor-creditor rela-
tionship when a national bankruptcy act is in effect is controlled and
regulated by a superstructure of legal rules. This theoretical stratum is
composed of an operational structure and a legal structure. The former
structure consists of the basis by which the state law in conflict with the
Bankruptcy Act is rendered void, whereas, the latter structure is com-
posed of the tests which determine whether the laws do conflict with the
Bankruptcy Act.
The basis of the operational structure is the authority of Congress
to enact bankruptcy laws. This Congressional power stems from Article
1, Section 8, Clause 4, of the Constitution which gives the national legis-
lature the broad power "to establish ... uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States." This power is effectuated
by the general grant which confers on the Congress the authority "to
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers. . . ."- Prior to the formation of the
Union, each state had the power to enact bankruptcy legislation. Upon
the adoption of the Constitution, the power was then vested in Congress
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §8.
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as supreme and exclusive,5 but the states still retain the authority to
enact bankruptcy legislation if Congress does not have an act in force.'
The enactment of a national bankruptcy law by Congress merely sus-
pends the power of the state to pass similar legislation.7 Conversely, the
repeal of a bankruptcy law would remove the disability of the state and
it could then provide remedies for creditors and debtors which cover the
same subject matter as a Congressional enactment.
The history of bankruptcy legislation by Congress began at the turn
of the 20th century. The present Backruptcy Act is a composite of the
Act of July 1, 1898,s and sixty amendatory acts. Three previous bank-
ruptcy acts had been enacted, but each of them were of short duration.,
The application of the operational structure to state statutes regulat-
ing the debtor-creditor relationship is not overwhelmingly complex.
Once the legal structure has been found to apply, the operational struc-
ture is set in motion. By this rigid mechanical procedure, the state
statute is rendered inoperative. The various theoretical steps in the
operational structure follow in succession as they are logically applied.
The first step is the determination that the state statute is suspended in-
asmuch as it is in conflict with the national bankruptcy act. After that
process, the statute is then declared void,10 the result of its suspension.
Following this sequence is the pronouncement that the provisions of the
statute are inoperative.
As pointed out previously, a statute of a state cannot be rendered
void unless it has been found to be in conflict with the national bank-
ruptcy act. A state statute is in conflict with the act if it is determined
that it is an insolvency law. This determination is conducted by the ap-
plication of the legal structure to the state statute. Unlike the opera-
tional structure, this process is more intricate due to the various tests
which compose the legal structure. These tests which have been devel-
oped by the courts over a number of years vary principally in the degree
5 6 Am. Ju. Bankruptcy §11 (1950).
6 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
7 Ogden v. Saunders, 7 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). This view was early
recognized by some states: Baxter County Bank v. Copeland, 114 Ark. 316,
169 S.W. 1180 (1914); Rockville National Bank v. Latham, 88 Conn. 70, 89
Atl. 1117 (1914); Pelton v. Sheridan, 74 Ore. 176, 144 Pac. 410 (1914);
Duryea v. Muse, 117 Wis. 399, 94 N.W. 365 (1903) ; Hasbrouck v. La Febre,
23 Wyo. 367, 152 Pac. 168 (1915). For a discussion of some earlier views, see
11 MicH. L. REv. 60 (1912).
8 Supra note 1.
9 Prior Acts: 2 Stat. 19 (1800), repealed, December 19, 1803, 2 Stat. 248; 5
Stat. 440 (1841), repealed, March 3, 1843, 5 Stat. 614; 14 Stat. 517 (1867),
repealed, 1878, 20 Stat. 99.
10 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929). For a criticism of
this case, see 27 Mzcn. L. REv. 696 (1929). Cf., 42 HAgv. L. Rxv. 823 (1929).
However, there are two views with respect to the effect of suspension. One
view holds that the state law is void. 29 CoLUM. L. REv. 519 (1929); 11
M~AQ. L. Rav. 101 (1926). The other view holds that the state statute is not
rendered entirely void. 49 YALE L. J. 1090, 1091, n. 12 (1940).
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of their generality. Arranging these standards according to their uni-
versality, figuratively speaking, causes the legal structure to have a
veneer-like quality. Nevertheless, these tests are consistent with one
another, and their differences are attributed to the fact that they ap-
proach the state's power from divergent but not unassociated bases.
The application of these tests to particular statutes illustrates their func-
tionability as well as their over-lapping nature. For instance, if a criter-
ion lower in the legal structure is applicable to a state statute, another
test situated higher in the structure can likewise apply. Yet, if one test is
not pertinent, the state statute can fall under the purview of a more
general test. In any event, a state statute is suspended because it is in the
realm of one of the tests regardless of which guage applies. The conse-
quence of having a state law considered in the sphere of the legal struc-
ture is the determination that it is in conflict with the aims and purposes
of the national bankruptcy act.
The basis of the legal structure is the classification of each remedy
provided by the state legislature into either an insolvency law or a non-
insolvency law. An insolvency law arises from an invalid exercise of
the state legislature whereby the state enacts a statute which conflicts
with the national bankruptcy act. Hence, the mere existence of the na-
tional bankruptcy act suspends such laws.
On the other hand, the state has power to pass certain statutes which
give the debtor and the creditor rights which are not affected by the
mere passive presence of the bankruptcy act. However, actions per-
formed pursuant to such state laws must be completed within four
months prior to an invoking of the national bankruptcy act.1' The state
statute itself is not suspended by the operation of the bankruptcy act;
however, the acts done pursuant to the statute within the four month
period are affected.
The jurisdiction of the trustee in bankruptcy is extinguished in this
latter type of statute by the passage of four months. However, under an
insolvency law, the trustee in bankruptcy never loses his jurisdiction.
Consequently, the controversy usually arises when the trustee in bank-
ruptcy attempts to set aside certain acts of the debtor and creditor on
the ground that they were performed under an insolvency law. The
debtor or creditor shall respond to this argument by contending that the
state statute was not an insolvency law and that the four month period
has passed, thus expiring the jurisdiction of the trustee over these
matters.
The determination of whether a state statute is insolvency legislation
is dependent upon the tests employed by the courts. Therefore, the com-
mencement of the discussion of the Wisconsin Statute necessitates a
review of the judicial tests which comprise the legal structure.
"I The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §21(b) (1958).
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It must be pointed out that an application of these broad tests to the
provisions of Chapter 128 will not prove to be illuminating. However,
these tests must be considered in the light of the specific statutory pro-
visions from which they were derived. It has already been discussed
that the purpose of these tests is the determination that the state statute
is insolvency legislation, and to ascertain this fact thereby renders the
state law in conflict with the aims and purposes of the Bankruptcy Act.1
2
One of the criterion employed is whether the statutory proceeding
was valid at common law.13 Another is whether the object sought to be
accomplished and the end attained is the same in effect as that sought to
be achieved by the bankruptcy court.14 A test which has particular value
is whether the state law is an involuntary proceeding.' 5 A general touch-
stone is whether the same subject matter covered by the Bankruptcy Act
is contained in the state statute.16 More meaningful is the standard which
determines that the state law contains the elements of insolvency legis-
lation.1
7
Research will reveal other tests that are employed by the courts, but
they are usually subsidiary to and branch out from the ones enumerated
above. An example of such a secondary test is one which ascertains
whether the basic characteristic of the state statute is the insolvency of
the individual or corporation against whom the proceeding is directed.' s
Another is whether the state law offers a choice to the creditor of either
proceeding under the state statute or the Bankruptcy Act.
VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS
Chapter 128 is entitled "Creditors' Actions" and is primarily con-
cerned with the regulation of voluntary assignments for the benefit of
creditors. Such an assignment is defined as a voluntary transfer by a
debtor of his property to an assignee in trust to apply the property or
proceeds thereof to the payment of his debts and the return of the sur-
plus, if any, to him.' 9 Although a voluntary assignment is the fourth act
of bankruptcy 0 the courts have uniformly and consistently held that
22 In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., supra note 2; International Shoe Co.
v. Pinkus, supra note 10; Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918).
3In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., supra note 2; Johnson v. Star, 287
U.S. 529 (1933) ; Boese v. King, 108 U.S. 379 (1883).
'4 In re Salmon & Salmon, 143 Fed. 395 (W.D. Mo. 1906).
15 In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., supra note 2; In re Weedman Stave
Co., 199 Fed. 948 (E.D. Ark. 1912); Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U.S. 496 (1875).26 In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., supra note 2; First Nat. Bank in Albu-
querque v. Robinson, 107 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1939). Cf., Kreft, What is the
"Subject of Bankruptcies"?, 6 TEmp. L. Q. 141 (1932).
"7 In re Weedman Stave Co., supra note 15.8 In re Schwartz Bros., 58 F. Supp. 761 (3d Div. D. Minn. 1945). Cf., 49 YALE
L.J. 1090, 1097 (1940).
19 6 C.J.S. Assignments For the Benefit of Creditors §1 (1937). Cf., Black v.
Palmer, 15 Ill. App. 2d 207, 145 N.E2d 797 (1957).
2 0 The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §21(a) (4) (1958). Cf., In re McCrum, 214
Fed. 207 (2d Cir. 1914) and 1 CoLuR BANKRUPTCY 52.78 (1956).
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statutes concerning them are merely regulatory in nature and are not to
be considered insolvency legislation.2 Consequently, those provisions of
Chapter 128 which systematize voluntary assignments for the benefit of
creditors are not drawn into question.12
Since the state then has the authority to legislate with respect to this
aspect of the debtor-creditor relationship, the theory which sustains this
power becomes significant in the determination of the doubtful pro-
visions of Chapter 128. The reason for the validity of such statutes is
that assignments for the benefit of creditors existed at common law
long before the adoption of the Constitution and the subsequent passage
of the Bankruptcy Act. Inasmuch as the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Act did not abrogate the common law right to assign for the benefit of
creditors, statutes regulating this common law right were not suspended
by the Act. This reasoning, which had been adopted by an early Texas
Court, was approved by the Supreme Court when it quoted the Texas
Court:
"The statute in question . . . proscribes a mode for the ad-
ministration of the estates of insolvents under assignments made
by the debtors themselves, which would be good at common law,
unaided by the statute, and, like any other trust, could be en-
forced in a court of equity in the absence of a statute providing
a mode of administration." 23
The relationship of the National Bankruptcy Act to state statutes regu-
lating the voluntary assignments was further clarified in another state
decision,
The word 'assignment' had, at the time this statute was adopted,
a well defined meaning, understood by all the people, and it has
no different meaning in said act .... According to the common
acception of the term, it is a transfer without compulsion of law
by a debtor of his property to an assignee in trust, to apply the
same or the proceeds thereof to the payment of his debts, and
return the surplus, if any, to the debtor.
24
Although a state has the power to regulate voluntary assignments
for the benefit of creditors, this power is not without limits. The extent
to which such statutes can furnish rules of procedure has not been
settled, and it was stated that
21 In re Wittstein, 166 F.Supp. 122 (D. St. Thomas & St. Johns, V.I. 1958);
Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 518 (1933), affirming, 210 Wis. 20,
242 N.W. 725; Johnson v. Star, supra note 13; In re Smith, 92 Fed. 135
(D. Ind. 1899); Mayer v. Hellman, supra note 15. Cf., 6 AM. Jua. Bank-
ruptcy §11 (1950). For a general discussion, see Mulder & Solomon, Effects
of the Chandler Act upon General Assignments and Compositions, 87 U.
PA. L. REv. 763 (1939).
22 In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., supra note 2.
23 Johnson v. Star, supra note 13, at 528-29. The Texas case quoted by the
Supreme Court is Keating v. Vaughn, 61 Tex. 518, 524 (1884).
24 Black v. Palmer, supra note 19, quoting, Farwell v. Nilsson, 133 IIl. 45, 49,
24 N.E. 74, 75 (1890).
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[t]here is no clear-cut definitive test by which to determine
whether a state statute dealing with assignments for the benefit
of creditors is so essentially a bankruptcy law as inherently to
conflict with, and be suspended by the Federal Act.25
The general limitation which has been placed upon this type of statute
is that its provisions cannot expand the contractual aspects of the com-
mon law assignment by purporting to discharge the debtor upon com-
pliance with the terms of the debtor's instrument of assignment. What-
ever procedural steps are specified, extinguishing debt liability, or any
remaining portion thereof, the state law gets into the realm of bank-
ruptcy legislation.r
Although a state statute regulating voluntary assignments establishes
a comprehensive system of administering and distributing estates of in-
solvents to the creditors, this system has escaped the ominous effect of
the Bankruptcy Act since such voluntary assignments were valid at
common law. 7 Therefore, the provisions of Chapter 128 which regulate
voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors are not in conflict
with the Bankruptcy Act.
Be that as it may, Sections 128.08 and 128.17, coupled with related
sections, cannot be sustained by the above argument because they do
not purport to regulate a voluntary assignment. Instead, upon certain
acts of the debtor, Section 128.08 provides for a proceeding through
which the creditor has the property of the debtor sequestrated by the
court. Likewise pursuant to this section, the property is transferred to
a receiver who distributes it among the creditors under Section 128.17.
In effect, these provisions operate as a forced assignment of the prop-
erty of the debtor to his creditors and are as comprehensive as the sec-
tions regulating voluntary assignments. However, the theory which sus-
tains the validity of the state statutes regulating voluntary assignments
cannot be invoked with respect to Sections 128.08 and 128.17. The com-
mon law does not provide the creditor with the right to proceed against
a debtor and to have the property distributed among the remain-
ing creditors. These rights are purely statutory and have no basis in
the common law, and since they in effect operate similarly to the Bank-
ruptcy Act, a determination can be made upon this ground that the state
legislature does not have the power to provide the creditor with these
rights.
PROVISION FOR DISCHARGE
It must be noted that Chapter 128 does not contain a discharge pro-
vision whereby the debtor's obligations are abolished once he or the
255 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §2114 (1953).
26 Ibid.
27Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., supra note 21. For a discussion of the effect
of the Bankruptcy Act on state statutes regulating voluntary assignments
for the benefit of creditors, see 24 VA. L. REv. 66 (1937) ; 42 YALE L. J. 1140(1933).
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creditor takes advantage of the statute. No searching issue exists as to
what effect the Bankruptcy Act has on a statute which has a discharge
provision-it is unquestionably fatal! The reason that this test is con-
clusive is that the discharge provision is a subject matter of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, and its existence will ipso facto render the state law void
as an insolvency law.28 The absence of a discharge provision and its
consequences with respect to the state statute is a reoccurring theme in
decisions concerning insolvency laws. The courts, however, have no
difficulty in dispensing this ubiquitous issue. They, along with legal
writers, are in agreement that a discharge provision is not an essential
element of an insolvency law; a state statute can be considered an in-
solvency law on any one of the various grounds.2 9 Therefore, the failure
of the Wisconsin Legislature to include a discharge provision in Chapter
128 does not, of itself, cause the Statute to be valid.
INVOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS
One of the grounds upon which to sustain the invalidity of a state
statute is to prove that it is an involuntary proceeding 0 At one time
there was a split of authority as to whether involuntary proceedings
were suspended by the Bankruptcy Act ;31 however, the present tendency
of the federal courts is to hold that involuntary proceedings are sus-
pended.3
2
As to what constitutes an involuntary proceeding is ascertained by
analyzing the Bankruptcy Act and the decisions concerning this test.
Drawing from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, proceedings are
classified as voluntary and involuntary.3 3 Voluntary proceedings are
initiated by the debtor, and, on the other hand, involuntary proceedings
are initiated by a creditor or by creditors.3 4 Therefore, proceedings are
considered from the standpoint of the debtor and not from that of the
creditor.
A distinction, however, must be made between involuntary proceed-
ings (which cause a statute to become an insolvency law) and provisions
281n re Weedman Stave Co., supra note 15; Hanover National Bank v. Moyses,
186 U.S. 181 (1902). For other cases, see 6 AM. JuR. Bankruptcy §3 (1950).29 In re Lanquist, 70 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1934). See, also, 49 YALE L. J. 1090,
1092 (1940).
30 In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., supra note 2.
31 6 Am. JUR. Bankruptcy §11 (1950).
32 In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., supra note 2; First Nat. Bank in Albu-
querque v. Robinson, supra note 16; International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, supra
note 10; In re Weedman Stave Co., supra note 15. See, also, Williston,
The Effect of a National Bankruptcy Law Upon States, 22 HARV. L. REV.
547 (1909); 8 Wis. L. REV. 282 (1933) and 5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY
§2106 (1953). Despite the weight of authority, Connecticut has an involuntary
proceeding. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §45-130 (1960).
3 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPrcY 3.03 (1956). The elements of an involuntary pro-
ceeding are the presence of the ratable distribution along with an involuntary
suit. 8 Wis. L. REV. 282 (1933).
34 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 53.03 (1956).
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of a statute which afford a creditor a means by which he can enforce
his judgment against the debtor. Such latter rights are singular in na-
ture; they do not extend the rights of the creditor to the point whereby
he has the entire property of the debtor distributed among all the
creditors.
Viewing Sections 128.06 and 128.17 as a whole, they fall under the
characteristics of an involuntary proceeding. These sections bestow
more than the mere right of a creditor to enforce a judgment against
the debtor; they contemplate the antithesis of a voluntary proceeding.
Section 128.06 is available only to the creditor, and under this section
he has the right to have the property of the debtor sequestrated. Such
a proceeding from the standpoint of the debtor is highly involuntary.
The other characteristic is fulfilled inasmuch as Section 128.17 provides
for the distribution of all of the property of the debtor to both secured
and unsecured creditors.
COMPARISON OF THE PRESENT STATUTE
WITH THE FORMER VALID ONE
In the comparison of the provisions of the present statute with the
invalid one of 1951, particular attention should be paid to the case of
In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co.A5 This case held that Sections
128.06 and 128.08 of the 1951 Statutes were suspended for the reason
that they provided for an involuntary proceeding. Under Section
128.06(1951), the creditor could maintain a proceeding against the in-
solvent debtor who had committed one of the five enumerated acts, which
acts were five of the six acts of bankruptcy as defined by the Bank-
ruptcy Act.36 Pursuant to this section, the petitioned court initially had
to find whether the debtor was insolvent and whether he had instituted
a proceeding to vacate the attachment, execution or garnishment, or
whether he secured a release of it. After this finding and upon the peti-
tion of two or more creditors whose debts were $200 or over, the court
would appoint a receiver and distribute the property pro rata among
the creditors. Circuit Judge Swaim found that there was no doubt that
this section was suspended because it was in conflict with the subject
matter covered by the federal law.3 7
In the comparison of the two statutes, close attention must be paid
to the Wisconsin definition of insolvency, which has not changed since
1937.31 A significant feature of the Wisconsin definition under Section
35 Supra note 2.
36 Compare §128.06 (1951), created by Wis. LAWS 1937, ch. 431, with The Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §21 (1958). The operation of the 1951 Statute is dis-
cussed in Rieselbach, Sequestration for the Benefit of Creditors, 23 MAR.
L. REv. 59 (1939).37 In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., sepra note 2, at 654. The validity of
the 1951 Statute was challenged in the same year that the Wisconsin Legisla-
ture enacted the law creating the Statute. 24 VA. L. REv. 66 (1937).
3 8 Wis. STAT. §128.04 (1959).
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128.04 is that it not only covers the same subject matter as the Bank-
ruptcy Act definition,3 9 but it also states that a person shall be deemed
insolvent "if an execution be returned unsatisfied or if he shall make
an assignment for the benefit of creditors."40 The importance of this
definition, which is broader than the Bankruptcy Act definition, shall be
illustrated in the proceedings brought against corporations.
Under Section 128.08(1) of the 1951 Statutes, the court was given
the power to sequestrate the property of a debtor and to appoint a re-
ceiver therefor when a petition under Section 128.06 was filed. Seques-
tration and the appointment of a receiver could be done also when an
execution against a domestic corporation was returned unsatisfied in
whole or in part. With respect to Section 128.08, the court summarily
dismissed it as being invalid in so far as it was interrelated with Section
128.06.41
It must be pointed out that both the 1951 Statute under Section
128.06 and the present Statute under Section 128.08 combined with
Section 128.17 provided for the administration of the debtor's property.
Disregarding for the present Section 128.17(1959), an analysis and
comparison of the former sections and their effect upon the debtor re-
veals that they are closely akin to the present provisions of Section
128.08. Of particular significance in the line of approach to the analysis
and comparison is the court's consideration of Section 128.08(1951).
Judge Swaim stated that, "In so far as Section 128.08 is interrelated
with Section 128.06 it is subject to the same objection as this later one."
[Emphasis supplied.] It then must be borne in mind that since Section
128.06(.1951) was invalid in its entirety, each section of it was invalid.
Following this line of reasoning, if any present section is found to be
similar to any previously held invalid section, it, likewise, is invalid.
Consequently, the analysis and comparison shall proceed with the in-
tricacies of relating the two sections of 1951 and comparing them with
the present section. Since Section 128.08(1959) is generally worded
as Section 128.08(1951), these two sections shall be the basis of analysis.
From this basis, the analyzed parts of Section 128.08(1959) shall be
compared with Section 128.06(1951). This basis of comparison shall
be the grounds upon which the creditor can proceed against the debtor.
The remedies provided by Section 128.08(1) (1959) and Section
128.08(1) (1951) are the same and the first paragraph of the two sec-
tions is worded exactly like:
The court within the proper county may sequestrate the property
of a debtor and appoint a receiver therefor :42
39 The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §1 (1958).
4o Supra note 38.41 In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., supra note 2, at 654.
42 Wis. STAT. §128.08(1) (1959) and Wis. LAWS, 1937, ch. 431 which created
WIs. STAT. §128.08(1) (1951) hereafter referred by the latter citation.
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However, the grounds for obtaining the remedies under the two sec-
tions are dissimilar:
[1959] When an execution against a judgment debtor is returned
unsatisfied in whole or in part.
43
[1951] When a petition under Section 128.06 shall be filed.4 4
Relating now to Section 128.06(1951), a petition under that section can
be filed when
two or more of his creditors owning claims of not less than two
hundred dollars in the aggregate against an insolvent debtor
whenever such debtor shall have within four months prior to
the commencement of such action: [The Statute then listed the
five acts any of which would have been a ground for commencing
the suit.] 45
Although these acts have been abolished, act (c) under the invalid
Statute is similar in effect as a ground in Section 128.08(1) (a) (1959)
since (c) read:
Suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a
lien through legal proceedings, and not having at least five days
before a sale or final disposition of any property affected by such
lien vacated or discharged such lien ;48
Comparing Section 128.08(1) (a) (1959) with Section 128.06(1) (c)
(1951), it is readily observed that the ground for procuring the remedy
under the present section is broader than the ground under the former
one. Under the present section, the limitations and qualifications which
the former section contained no longer have to be complied with by the
creditor. All that is required is that the execution against a judgment
debtor be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part. Thus, since Section
128.08(1)(a)(1959) is broader in effect than Section 128.06(1)(c)
(1951), the present section will have the same objection as the former
one. More simply stated, since a creditor could not have proceeded under
Section 128.08(1) (a) (1951) and use Section 128.06(1) (c) (1951) as
a ground for the suit, neither can a creditor proceed under Section
128.08(1) (a) (1959) because the ground here is more comprehensive
than the previous invalid one.
Using the same basis of approach to Section 128.08(1) (b) (1959),
which deals with corporations, will yield the same results.
The court within the proper county may sequestrate the property
of a debtor and appoint a receiver therefor :47
43 Wis. STAT. §128.08(1) (a) (1959). Note that when an execution is returned un-
satisfied, the debtor is classified as an insolvent under the purview of Section
128.04 (1959).44 Wis. STAT. §128.08(1) (a) (1951).45 WIs. STAT. §128.06(1) (1951).4 6 WIS. STAT. §128.06(1) (c) (1951).
4r Supra note 42.
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[1959] When a corporation has been dissolved or is insolvent
or is in imminent danger of insolvency or has forfeited its cor-
porate rights. 4
8
[1951] When an execution against a domestic corporation is re-
turned unsatisfied in whole or in part. 49
Comparing Section 128.08(1) (b) (1959) with Section 128.08(1)(b)
(1951) reveals that the present provision is more liberal because there
are four situations listed in the present section to only one enumerated
in the former one.
The Wisconsin definition of insolvency now plays an important role
in proving that the former invalid Statute was more limited in scope
than the present Statute. Under the former section, insolvency was not
a ground upon which a creditor could bring a proceeding against a cor-
poration. It was pointed out earlier that to have an execution returned
unsatisfied was included in the definition of insolvency. In addition to
this former limited ground, a creditor now can proceed against a cor-
poration,
whenever the aggregate of [its] property, exclusive of any prop-
erty which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed or re-
moved or permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent to
defraud, hinder or delay his creditors, shall not, at a fair valu-
ation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts .... or if [it] shall
make an assignment for the benefit of creditors.50
It must be remembered that a corporation could also be proceeded
against under Section 128.08(1) (a) (1951) by employing Section 128.06
(1) (c) (1951) as the basis for bringing the suit. With respect to Section
128.08(1) (b) (1959), the corporation merely has to be in one of the
four enumerated situations. Comparing these situations with the acts
under Section 128.06(1) (1951) it is readily perceived that the creditor
can proceed against the debtor sooner under the present Statute than
he could under the former one. Employing the present Statute, the cor-
poration merely has to be in imminent danger of insolvency or at least
be insolvent before the creditor can proceed. Hence, the creditor now
can commence his action prior to the commitment of an act (of "bank-
ruptcy") which was needed under the former invalid Statute. From
this standpoint, the creditor has a longer period in which to bring the
suit than the Bankruptcy Act itself provides. Since the former Statute
covered the same subject matter as the Bankruptcy Act and was con-
sidered invalid, the present Statute which bestows the creditor with
more extensive coverage than the latter Statute is also invalid.
Another comparison can be made with the limitations placed upon
48 Wis. STAT. §128.08(1) (b) (1959).
49 WIS. STAT. §128.08(1) (b) (1951).
50 Supra note 38.
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creditors in Section 128.06(1) (1951) and the lack of these limitations
in Section 128.08(1) (b) (1959). Under the former section, there had to
be two or more creditors who had claims of "two hundred dollars" or
more, and the "act" had to have been completed within four months.
Alleging these facts, the creditor could then proceed under the section
to seek his relief. However, under Section 128.08(1) (b) (1959) there
are no limitations, and one creditor can proceed against the corporation
despite the smallness of his claim or the length of time of the corpora-
tion's financial difficulties.
A close comparison of the acts enumerated in the invalid Section
128.06(1951) with the grounds enumerated in Section 128.08(1)(b)
(1959) will disclose that the bases upon which to bring actions are con-
siderably extended by the latter section. But in no instances are the bases
in the present Statute limited as they were in the former Statute.
Comparing the first "act" under the invalid Section 128.06(1) (a)
(1951) with the first portion of the Wisconsin definition of insolvency
will reveal that they are worded exactly alike.
[1951] Conveyed, transferred, concealed or removed, or per-
mitted to be concealed or removed, any part of his property with
intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, or any of them ;51
The distinction between the two sections is that under Section 128.06
(1) (a) (1951) it was a ground for bringing a suit against a corporation
whereas, in the definition, the amount of this property is excluded in
determining the insolvency of the corporation. The fact remains, how-
ever, that if a corporation committed the "act" described in Section
128.06(1) (a) (1951) and this amount of property was excluded from
the corporation's assets, it is doubtful if it would have sufficient assets
left to pay its remaining debts. If this fact be the case, the corporation
is considered insolvent, and the creditor's suit arises. Thus, in effect, to
proceed against a corporation under Section 128.08(1)(b)(1959) by
alleging insolvency as the basis would be similar as using the invalid
Section 128.06(1) (a) (1951) as the basis.
Three other acts listed in former Section 128.06(1) (1951) concern
insolvent corporations. Under these sections an insolvent corporation
could be proceeded against if it,
[1951] (b) Transferred, while insolvent, any portion of his
property to one or more of his creditors with intent to prefer
such creditors over his other creditors; or 52
(c) Suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to ob-
tain a lien through legal proceedings, and not having at least five
days before a sale or final disposition charged such lien; or
53
51 Wis. STAT. §128.06(1) (a) (1951).
52 WIs. STAT. §128.06(1) (b) (1951).
53 WIs. STAT. §128.06(1) (c) (1951).
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* * * * *
(e) Admitted in writing his inability to pay his debts and his
willingness to be adjudged insolvent on that groundf'
However, under the purview of Section 128.08(1) (b) (1959) the cor-
poration does not have to commit any of these "acts" in addition to being
insolvent. The fact of insolvency alone is a sufficient basis upon which
to proceed against the corporation.
A detailed comparison is unnecessary to disclose the fact that the
ground of being in imminent danger of insolvency would greatly ex-
tend the basis of the proceeding.
Inasmuch as the Wisconsin definition of insolvency includes the
making of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, a corporation can
be proceeded against under Section 128.08(1)(b)(1959) if the cor-
poration has made such an assignment. By comparing this basis with
the "act" contained in Section 128.06(1) (d) (1951), it shall be illustrated
that that ground was more limited than the present ground. Under the
invalid section, the assignment for the benefit of creditors had to be
made fraudulently or collusively. 55 Since these two elements have been
eliminated by Section 128.08(1) (b) (1959), the extention of this basis
is salient.
In a summary of these comparisons, the discovery is that former
invalid Section 128.08(1951) compared with Section 128.08(1959) are
substantially the same, with the important exception that the present
Statute offers the creditor more liberal grounds. This discovery bears
true when the former invalid sections are compared with the present
sections concerning corporations. With respect to corporations, the
bases for the creditors suit under Section 128.08(1)(b)(1959) is
broader in scope than the "acts" enumerated in the former invalid
Section 128.06(1) (1951). Since the invalid section was considered to
cover the same subject matter as bankruptcy, the same objection is
made to the present section.
The difficulty with analyzing and comparing the present Statute with
the former one is that the forest may not be seen due to the closeness
of the trees. The main obstacle to the validity of the former Statute is
that it provided for an involuntary proceeding. Another obstacle in its
path is the fact that it covered the same subject matter as did the Bank-
ruptcy Act. These same objections are contended in regard to the pres-
ent Statute. Therefore, the value of the analysis and comparison is not
diminished by this intricate approach since it has illustrated that the
differences between the invalid Statute and the present one are minimal
and, in certain aspects, nominal.
PROVISION FOR DISTRIBUTION
As pointed out, there are a variety of tests which are employed in
54 V\FTs" STAT. §128.06(1) (e) (1951).
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the determination of whether a state statute regulating the debtor-
creditor relationship is an insolvency law. The over-lapping nature of
these tests is illustrated in the following discussion of the effect of dis-
tribution of the debtor's property on state statutes with respect to the
Bankruptcy Act. An application of three tests discloses that a provision
for distribution causes the state statute to be an insolvency law. The
term distribution for the purposes of the following discussion means
the administration of the debtor's property to both secured and unse-
cured creditors.
Section 128.08 provides for the appointment of a receiver, and the
duty of the receiver according to Section 128.10 is to "administer [the]
estate pursuant to the provisions of this chapter." This administration
is performed under Section 128.17. Consequently, the power of the
Wisconsin Legislature to provide for administration shall now be
brought into focus.
At the outset, a distinction must be made between distribution under
the provisions governing voluntary assignments for the benefit of
creditors and distribution pursuant to Section 128.08 related with Sec-
tion 128.17. Noted previously, the passage of the Bankruptcy Act did
not abrogate the common law rights of creditors and debtors to have
voluntary assignments. Therefore, state statutes regulating such assign-
ments are valid. An essential feature of a voluntary assignment is the
orderly distribution of the debtor's property to all classes of creditors.
Thus, the regulation of distribution by statutes controlling voluntary
assignments is also valid. Their validity is sustained under the theory
that it was valid at common law to distribute the debtor's property in
voluntary assignment cases. However, outside of this instance, the
courts have not discovered distribution to be an essential element in the
operation of any other common law remedy.
A provision for distribution runs afoul of the test of whether the
object sought to be accomplished and the end attained is the same in
effect as that sought to be achieved by the Bankruptcy Act. The Na-
tional Bankruptcy Act provides that the bankruptcy court should
[c]ause the estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money
and distributed, and determine controversies in relation thereto.
... [Emphasis supplied.] 56
The Bankruptcy Act has two purposes, the discharge of the debtor and
the distribution of his assets to his creditors.57 Prior discussion leads to
the conclusion that a state statute which provides for the discharge of
the debtor is clearly an insolvency law, but that this test of insolvency
55 Wis. STAT. §128.06(1) (d) (1951).5 6 The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §11(7) (1958).5 7 Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459 (1913); In re Munford, 255 Fed. 108(E.D. N.C. 1919).
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is not the sole one.58 Reflecting this principle again is the case of In re
Leslie5 in which the court stated:
The main purpose of the bankrupt law is to prevent prefer-
ences, and secure a fair and an equitable division of the bankrupt
estate among the creditors, not to grant discharges. [Emphasis
supplied. ] 60
The conclusion that distribution is the main purpose of the Bank-
ruptcy Act is also brought out by a leading secondary source which
states that "distribution" is the "ultimate aim and goal of the entire
proceeding."
'61
Viewing the provision for distribution in the light of case law and
text writers, a state statute which provides for the distributing of the
estate of the debtor to all creditors in effect achieves the same end or
purpose as that sought by the Bankruptcy Act. Therefore, distribution
as provided for by Section 128.08 and Section 128.17 is insolvency leg-
islation.
Judicial interpretations of the Bankruptcy Act and the application
of the second test in determining whether a state statute is an insolvency
law also leads to the conclusion that the provision for distribution of the
assets of the insolvent debtor is the subject matter of the Act. In Han-
over National Bank v. Moyses, 2 the Supreme Court stated that,
[t]he subject of "bankruptcies" includes the power to discharge
the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to
distribute his property. [Emphasis supplied]6 3
Inasmuch as discharge is not essential, distribution as provided by the
Wisconsin Statute is insolvency legislation because it covers the same
subject matter as the Bankruptcy Act.
The third test in this discussion of the effect of distribution is
whether the state law contains the elements of an insolvency law. Gen-
erally speaking, all the elements of an insolvency law must be present
in order for it to be considered invalid. However, the element of dis-
tribution is particularly significant in that its absence in certain situ-
ations is the test for the validity of the statute.
Distribution of the assets of the debtor among the creditors is an
element of an insolvency law :64
The elements of an insolvency law are insolvency, surrender of
property, its administration by a receiver or trustee, distribution
58 Supra note 29.
59 119 Fed. 406 (N.D. N.Y. 1903). Cf., Pope v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co.,
152 Wis. 611, 614, 140 N.W. 348, 350 (1913).
60 Id. at 410.
61 6 REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §2777 (1952).
62 Supra note 28.
63 Id. at 188.
64 In re Weedman Stave Co., supra note 15.
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of the assets among the creditors, and a provision for priorities
or other matters not permissible in the absence of such a statute.
[Emphasis supplied.] 
65
In the Weedman. decision, the court also stated that a provision for dis-
charge of the debtor from the unpaid balances of his debt is not essen-
tial to an insolvency law.66
There is a striking similarity of the provisions of the Arkansas
Statute considered in the Weedman, case and the provisions of Sections
128.08 and 128.17. The Arkansas Statute provided that where a debtor
became insolvent, a creditor could petition the court to have it appoint
a state receiver which would distribute the property of the debtor among
the creditors:
By reference to the statutes of Arkansas ... it will be found that
this act contains every one of these [insolvency] essentials. Sec-
tion 949 provides for preferences for wages and salaries of la-
borers and employ6s and prohibits all others; section 750 author-
izes the court to take charge of all of the assets of the insolvent
corporation and distribute them pro rata among the creditors
after paying the wages and salaries due laborers and employ6s;
section 951 directs all preferences obtained within 90 days
whether by attachment, confession of judgment, or otherwise, to
be set aside by the chancery court, and the creditor be required
to release his preferences and accept his pro rata share in the dis-
tribution of the assets of the insolvent corporation; and section
952 requires notice to be given to the creditors to present their
claims within 90 days or be barred.2
A detailed comparison of the Wisconsin Statute with the Arkansas
Statute need not be made for the purpose of illustrating the similitude
between their essential characteristics. Inasmuch as the Arkansas Statute
had the essentials requisite of an insolvency law, it follows that the
Wisconsin Statute does as well.
Conversely speaking, a statute which does not provide for the dis-
tribution of the assets of an insolvent debtor but merely provides for
a creditors' proceeding for the enforcement of liens is not an insolvency
law.68 This principle was alluded to by the Supreme Court in the con-
sideration of a West Virginia Statute. This Statute provided that after
creditors have obtained and docketed judgments constituting liens on
the real estate of a debtor they have a right to institute a creditors' suit
65 Id. at 950.
6 6 Ibid. With respect to insolvent private state banks, the Bankruptcy Act con-
fers upon courts of bankruptcy jurisdiction the exclusive and paramount
power to adjudge private bankers bankrupt and to administer their property.
State laws assuming to confer upon state officers or courts authority to ad-
minister the property of such banks are suspended and must give way to
the Bankruptcy Act. In re Sage, 224 Fed. 525 (E.D. Mo. 1915), aff'd, 236
Fed. 644 (8th Cir. 1916).
67 In re Weedman Stave Co., supra note 15, at 950-51.
68 Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931).
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in a state court to marshal and enforce the liens and sell the real estate
subject thereto. The court held that it was not an insolvency statute
because
[t]his statute says nothing about a distribution of assets amongst
general creditors. . . . It is merely a proceeding in equity to do
what would be done by a sheriff or marshal under an appropriate
writ for the sale of real estate in execution at law. [Emphasis
supplied.] 69
However, the Wisconsin Statute does contain a provision for distribu-
tion, and it is not a mere proceeding whereby creditors' liens are en-
forced. Therefore, the element of distribution in the provisions of Sec-
tions 128.08 and 128.17 cause these sections to be insolvency legislation.
WINDING UP THE AFFAIRS OF A CORPORATION
Another legal ground for suspending a state statute because it is
insolvency legislation is that it has the same operation and effect as the
Bankruptcy Act. The operation of Section 128.08 and Section 128.17
against an insolvent corporation or a corporation which is in imminent
danger of insolvency is similar to the winding up the affairs of a cor-
poration. Although the corporation exists after the proceeding, it has
only nominal existence for it does not have any assets. A dissolution
proceeding could easily erase the name of the corporation from the
record books. Also, the distribution of the corporate property would in
effect discharge the debts of the corporation from any remaining lia-
bilities.7 0 Inasmuch as the defunct corporation after a suit under Sections
128.08 and 128.17 has no assets, it would be futile to bring an action
against it. And once the corporation is wiped off the books, it would be
impossible to bring actions against it since it has no legal existence.
The parade of decisions with respect to statutory proceedings which
wind up the affairs of insolvent corporations strongly holds that they are
suspended by the Bankruptcy Act.7 1 Therefore, the Wisconsin Statute
can be defeated upon the ground that it has the same effect as a statute
which provides for the winding up of the affairs of an insolvent cor-
poration.
69 Id. at 329.7 0In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., supra note 2, at 652. See 27 Miss. L. J.
230, 234 (1956).
71 First Nat. Bank in Albuquerque v. Robinson, supra note 16, at 53; In re
Watts and Sachs, 190 U.S. 1 (1903). For other cases holding this position,
see 5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §2118 (1953). "State laws providing for the
dissolution of a corporation are not suspended as in conflict with the Federal
Bankruptcy Act, where insolvency or bankruptcy is not within the terms or
contemplation of the law as a ground for dissolution." [Emphasis supplied.]
6 AM. JuR. Bankruptcy §11 (1950). Flying in the face of these holdings is a
Connecticut Statute which provides that the affairs of a corporation can
be wound up in a proceeding by a creditor upon either of two grounds, an




PROVISION FOR SEQUESTRATION AND RECEIVERSHIPS
I. General
The doubtful provisions of the Wisconsin Statute, the involuntary
proceeding and the distribution of the property of the debtor, were
analyzed and were fitted into the existing pattern of case law. The de-
termination of the invalidity of these provisions were viewed through
the eyes of the many tests which have been developed by the courts.
However, Section 128.08 provides for two remedies, receivership and
sequestration, which must be considered before the determination be-
comes conclusive. It must be remembered that the passage of the Bank-
ruptcy Act did not suspend the state's power to enact laws which had
their foundation in the common law. Another principle that must be
kept in mind with respect to the discussion of receiverships and of
sequestration is that the state legislature cannot provide for remedies
that did not exist at common law and which conflict with the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The question then arises, how far can the legislature of a
state extend the rights given through common law proceedings without
stepping out of its legislative boundaries.
II. Receiverships
A general discussion of receiverships and the power of the legisla-
ture to provide for them would be too far afield from the purpose of
this article. However, the appointment of receivers plays an important
role in so far as the rights of creditors are concerned.
The remedy of appointing a receiver originated at an early date in
the English courts of Chancery,7 and, consequently, the power of the
state to provide for them has not been suspended by the passage of the
Brankruptcy Act. A general definition of a receiver is that he is a per-
son, natural or artificial, appointed by a court to take custody, control,
and management of the property or funds of the debtor pending judicial
action concerning them.73 However, receiverships are not considered a
final remedy but rather a temporary remedy or status.7 4 Therefore, ap-
pointing a receiver is only part of the entire relief asked, and it is
merely an ancillary or provisional remedy which is used in connection
with an action pending for some other purpose.
The traditional concept of a receiver limits his use as merely an
immediate agency through which the rights of a creditor are secured.
The appointment of a receiver does not automatically clothe him with
the power to distribute the property of the debtor. This power must be
given to him by further legislation. The power of a receiver, then, is
dependent upon the rights of the creditors or debtors whom he in a
72 75 C.J.S. Receivers §4 (1952). See, also, Hunt. Conflict Between Equity and
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 39 Comm. L. J. 383 (1934).
73 75 C.J.S. Receivers §4 (1952).
74 75 C.J.S. Receivers §2 (1952).
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sense is representing. It shall not be questioned that the receiver does
have some power to distribute the property of the debtor in certain situ-
ations. However, this power is limited to only the situation where the
creditor has a lien on the property. Therefore, if the creditor is secured,
the state then has the power to provide him with a receiver to enforce
his rights gained under the lien.
This right of the secured creditor exists independently of whether
the debtor is solvent or insolvent. To extend this singular right of the
creditor to the point that through a receiver he has the power to have
all of the property of the debtor distributed pro rata is going far beyond
his common law right to enforce his lien. And to bestow upon creditors,
secured and unsecured alike, the right via a receiver to have all of the
assets of an insolvent corporation administered amongst them is also
greatly increasing their common law rights.
With respect to the Wisconsin Statute, Section 128.08 provides for
the appointment of a receiver by the court for the purpose of admin-
istering the property of the debtor by distributing it among the creditors.
Standing alone, receiverships are valid since they existed at common
law; however, if
the receivership or trusteeship is initiated under a state statute
which is in effect a state insolvency law tantamount to the bank-
ruptcy legislation, then such receivership will be superceded by
bankruptcy, whether or not within the four-month limit prescribed
by clause (21), as such proceedings are utterly null and void.75
There are many facets of receiverships that shall not be examined
but the preceding discussion has implied that the existence of the re-
ceiver under Section 128.08 can be discounted upon two grounds. The
first ground is that the creditor at common law did not have the right
to have the property of the debtor distributed among all the creditors.
Therefore, the receiver who obtains his rights from the creditors and
debtors is without this power. However, Section 128.08 contemplates that
the receiver will administer the property of the debtor to both secured
and unsecured creditors. The second ground alludes to the previous
discussion. Since the purpose of the receiver in the Wisconsin Statute
is for the same purpose as that of the Bankruptcy Act, namely, the
distribution of the assets of the debtor, the receiver's powers are sus-
pended by the Act. That is, the remedy of receivership is only ancillary
to the main purpose of the Statute. If the ultimate remedy consists of
an insolvency law, the provisional remedy (receivership), likewise, is
invalid.
75 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 52.78 (1956). "Nor are provisions for a receivership
of a corporation suspended as in conflict with the Federal Bankruptcy Act,
where they create simply ordinary proceedings to enforce liens against the




Generally, sequestration fits into the same category as receiverships.
It is also a mere auxiliary remedy by which the court obtains possession
and control of the property of the debtor. Historically speaking, seques-
tration was a process in Chancery proceedings by which the property of
the debtor was taken into custody by the court for the purpose of cre-
ating a lien thereon. 76 However, the writ which originated in England
has all but vanished from the list of devices used by the courts in mod-
ern practice. 77
Sequestration by itself offers no relief, but it is employed in con-
templation of giving relief by other measures in the final disposition of
the proceeding. As receiverships, sequestration is inextricably inter-
woven into the purpose for which the proceeding is brought. Since this
remedy is also dependent upon the ultimate purpose for which it is em-
ployed, if the legislature cannot enact laws with respect to a particular
purpose, the means by which such a purpose is achieved, likewise, fails
to be available to them.
The very nature of the sequestration causes the entire proceeding
under Section 128.08 to become involuntary. It is this initial involuntari-
ness that has raised the objection to this Section. Mere involuntariness
does not suffice; it must be coupled with the administration of the assets
of the debtor. Taken together, these two elements constitute what has
traditionally been considered an involuntary proceeding. Therefore,
since the Wisconsin Statute does provide for these two elements, it is
suspended. Consequently, the remedy of sequestration as well as the
remedy of receivership falls.
A. Sequestration of Corporate Assets
In addition to the above objection to sequestration as a whole, with
respect to corporations which are insolvent or in imminent danger of
insolvency, this remedy as provided in Section 128.08 is still unwarranted
when it is viewed in its historical perspective. At common law the only
way of endorcing a decree in Chancery was by attachment and seques-
tration.78 However, this method of attaching the property of the debtor
has been abandoned inasmuch as modern statutes permit equity decrees
to be enforced by execution in the same manner as judgments at law.7 9
Hence, this remedy had its roots in the common law and is not sus-
pended by the Bankruptcy Act which retains the state legislature's power
to provide for the remedy in state statutory form.
Prior to the passage of the 4th Act of Bankruptcy, it was the prac-
tice of some states to provide for the sequestration of an insolvent cor-
76 47 Am. Jun. Sequestration §2 (1943) ; 79 GJ.S. Sequestration §1 (1952).
7779 CJ.S. Sequestration §1 (1952).
78 Ibid.
79 79 C.J.S. Sequestration §1 (1952).
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poration's property and to provide for the winding up of the affairs of
the corporation.80 This type of proceeding was initiated by a creditor
after he had an execution returned unsatisfied or when the corporation
was insolvent."' An example of this type of statute was passed by the
Tennessee Legislature. Under this statute a creditor of a corporation
has the right to proceed against an insolvent corporation for the pur-
pose of winding up the affairs of the corporation. s2 Because there was
no bankruptcy act in effect at the time of these state statutes, the Ten-
nessee Legislature had full power to provide for this type of proceed-
ing, and the provision for sequestration to aid this proceeding was also
valid. However, upon the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act, not all
states repealed their statutes concerning the sequestration of the in-
solvent corporation's assets and the distribution of the assets among
the creditors. As late as 1917, the State of North Dakota had a statute
which read:
Whenever a judgment shall be obtained against any corporation
incorporated under the laws of this state and an execution issued
thereon shall have been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part,
the judgment creditor, or his legal representative may maintain
an action to procure a judgment sequestrating the property of a
corporation and providing for a distribution thereof. [Emphasis
supplied. ] 8 3
Litigation developed involving this Statute, and although the question
never was raised whether the Bankruptcy Act suspended this Statute,
the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered the purpose of the
Statute as follows:
The statutes, in short, are sequestration statutes. Their purpose
is to provide a means for collecting into a general fund all of the
assets of the insolvent corporation so that not only the debt due
to the petitioner but, if desired, its other debts, may be paid,
and also, if desired, its affairs may be wound up. [Emphasis
supplied. ] 84
The similarity of the North Dakota Statute to the Wisconsin Statute
is readily apparent save that the Wisconsin Statute is more extensive
with respect to the grounds upon which to proceed against the corpora-
tion. 5 By analogy to the North Dakota Statute, the purpose of the Wis-
consin Statute can also be discovered-the winding up of the affairs of
the corporation. Running the risk of being repetitious, the Wisconsin
80 19 C.J.S. Corporations §1429 (1940).
81 13 Am. JUR. Corporations §1281 (1938).
82 Tradesman Pub. Co. v. Knoxsville Car-Wheel Co., 95 Tenn. 634, 32 S.W.
1097 (1895).83 John Miller Co. v. Harvey Mercantile Co., 38 N.D. 531, 165 N.W. 558, 560
(1917).
84 Id. at 561.




Legislature does not have this power since it was suspended by the pas-
sage of the Bankruptcy Act.
Soon after the passage of the Bankruptcy Act, there occurred a
period in which some states recognized they had insolvency laws on
their books. These state courts then passed upon their own laws and
adjusted them so as to have them be in conformity with the Act. 6 Of
importance in this epoch was the suspension of a Maine Statute for the
reason that it was insolvency legislation.87 An examination of the Maine
Statute considered in the Moody case will disclose that the insolvency
provisions there are very much akin to the doubtful provisions of Chap-
ter 128. Although the exact remedy of sequestration was not provided
by the Maine Statute, the court in which the creditors filed their petition
had the authority to exercise broad equity powers."" Sequestration, it
must be recalled, is one of the equitable remedies not suspended by the
operation of the Bankruptcy Act. And if the Maine court had broad
equity powers, it would have had the inherent power to sequestrate
the property of the debtor. In place of the narrow remedy of sequestra-
tion was the court's power to "take charge of the estate of a corpora-
tion."9
Comparing the Maine statute with the Wisconsin Statute, one of the
very grounds upon which the corporation could be proceeded against
betrays their similarity; namely, "Whenever any corporation shall be-
come insolvent, or be in imminent danger of insolvency . .. 90 The
relief granted by the Maine Statute is characteristic to that granted by
the Wisconsin Statute, namely, the appointment of a receiver after the
court obtained control of the property. The receiver then was vested
with "plenary power over all the assets of the company, and [was]
required to distribute the assets as provided" in another section. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recognized that the law of their state
was insolvency legislation, and Justice Spear passing upon it stated:
While chapter 85 of the Laws of 1905 is not an insolvency
law in title or express terms, it yet operates as such in all essen-
tial features of taking charge of the property, bringing suits in
law or equity, discharging the liabilities, barring all claims not
presented, and distributing the assets of the corporation.... [Em-
phasis supplied.] 92
86 Mauran v. Crown Carpet Lining Co., 23 R.I. 324, 50 At. 331 (1901) ; In re
Storck Lumber Company, 114 Fed. 360 (D. Md. 1902); E. C. Wescott Co. v.
Berry, 69 N.H. 505, 45 Atl. 352 (1899); Parmenter Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton,
172 Mass. 178, 51 N.E. 529 (1898). State courts have the authority to pass
upon the question of whether or not a state law is insolvency legislation.
In re Curtis, 91 Fed. 737 (S.D. Ill. 1899), aff'd, 94 Fed. 630 (7th Cir. 1899).
87 Moody v. Port Clyde Development Co., 102 Me. 365, 66 Atl. 967 (1907).
88 ME. PUBLIC LAws 1905, ch. 85, §1.
89 Moody v. Port Clyde Development Co., supra note 87, at 973.9 0 Supra note 88.9 1 ME. PuBLic LAws 1905, ch. 85, §3.
92 Moody v. Port Clyde Development Co., supra note 87, at 972.
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Even at this early date when the laws regarding the distinction be-
tween insolvency legislation and valid legislation had not yet been re-
fined to the extent it is today, the Maine court did not find the issue
confusing nor the solution complex:
The principle of law applicable to the case under considera-
tion is clear and succinctly stated in 5 Cyc. 240, D, note 16. "So
far as the state law administers upon the estate of the insolvent
as a proceeding in the courts, the proceeding deriving its potency
and force from the law itself, and not from the voluntary act of
the debtor, and, where the estate is wound up judicially and the
debtor discharged, the state law is undoubtedly suspended by a
national bankruptcy act. . . ." It will be seen, however, that it is
not an essential element of an insolvency law that the debtor be
discharged. 93
The court then struck down the Statute because it contained the
elements of an insolvency law which are
authorizing a court to appoint an officer to take charge of the
estate of a corporation and collect and distribute its assets, and
that bars the debts which are not filed within the time ordered
by the court, is an insolvent law, but also that it is not necessary
for the act, in order to operate as such a law, to provide for the
discharge of the debtor. [Emphasis supplied.] 94
Needless to say, the similarity between the Wisconsin Statute and
the Maine Statute is salient. The disclosure of their likeness can be
made without tedious scrutiny. Both provide for the taking of the prop-
erty by the court upon the petition of a creditor if the corporation is
insolvent or is in imminent danger of insolvency. The Maine court could
obtain control of the property by exercising its equity powers; the Wis-
consin court would, more specifically, by sequestration which is also an
exercise of the court's equity powers. A receiver is appointed to take
charge of the property in both Statutes. The distribution of the assets
of the corporation is done pursuant to both Statutes, and neither pro-
vide for the discharge of the debts of the corporation. Finally, both
Statutes make provision for the barring of claims after a certain period,
Maine under Section 4 and Wisconsin under Section 128.14(2). 95
Despite the grant of equity power to the state court by the Maine
Statute, this power did not include the authority to perform the acts
subsequent to the taking control of the assets of the corporation. Hence,
the entire Statute was struck down as being insolvency legislation. The
Wisconsin Statute follows the Maine Statute almost to the letter. And
the mere fact that the Wisconsin court exercises its equity powers, as
did the Maine court, is not a sufficient reason to save it since the equity
93 Ibid.
Moody v. Port Clyde Development Co., supra note 87, at 973.
95 Wis. STAT. §128.14(2) (1959).
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powers do not include the power to perform all the acts provided by
the Statute.
Sequestration is a very harsh remedy and the extent to which the
state can provide for this remedy without contravening the Bankruptcy
Act is brought out by the case of In re Schwartz Bros 8 The Minnesota
Statute in this case provides as follows:
Upon complaint of a person obtaining judgment against a cor-
poration or his representatives, made after the return unsatisfied
of an execution issued thereon, the Court may sequestrate the
stock, property... and appoint a receiver of the same, and upon
final judgment upon any such complaint the Court shall order
the property remaining, or the proceeds thereof, to be disposed
of under its direction. . . . [The Statute then provided for the
distribution of the property.] 97
Upon careful consideration of the provisions of this Statute the
Federal Court upheld it on these grounds:
If the proceeding under section 8013 is a proceeding to enforce
a lien obtained more than four months before the bankruptcy
petition was filed, and if such proceeding is not an insolvency
proceeding, then it must follow that the subject of such pro-
ceedings is not a part of the bankruptcy estate and therefore not
subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.98
Certainly, one of the basic characteristics of an insolvency
statute is insolvency of the individual or corporation against whom
the proceedings are directed. But this statute applies equally to
solvent corporations. It will be noted that the right of a judg-
ment creditor to obtain the appointment of a receiver is not de-
pendent upon the insolvency of the corporation. 99
Moreover, it would seem that the salient purpose of the statute
is to aid a judgment creditor in the collection of his debt, and for
that purpose the assets are sequestrated .... 3-0
One distinction between the Minnesota Statute and the Wisconsin
Statute is that the latter applies only to insolvent corporations or to ones
that are imminently in danger of insolvency whereas the former applies
to corporations regardless of their financial status. Another distinction
is that the purpose of the Minnesota Statute is to enforce liens and not
to administer the assets of a bankrupt estate.' 0 '
It must be noted that this Statute dangerously approaches the area
considered as the subject matter of bankruptcy. It was saved by the fact
that the statutory purpose is to enforce liens, and that it applies to in-
96 In re Schwartz Bros., supra note 18.
97 MASON'S MINN. STAT. §8013 (1959).
98 In re Schwartz Bros., supra note 18, at 763.
99 Id. at 765.100 In re Schwartz Bros., supra note 18, at 765.
101 Id. at 764.
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solvent individuals as well as insolvent corporations. However, with
respect to the creation of liens the court stated,
It seems clear, therefore, that upon the appointment of a
receiver under Section 8013 a lien is created in favor of the
creditors.102
Yet, in certain instances, the statutory creation of liens also conflicts with
the subject matter of the Bankruptcy Act:
True, if the proceedings which created the lien are insolvency
proceedings which are null and void because of conflict with the
Bankruptcy Act, then it must follow that the liens are likewise
void. But the trustee herein does not contend that the proceed-
ings under Section 8013 are null and void.10 3
This tacit caution by the court indicates that where a statute provides for
receiverships which create liens for all creditors, it can conflict with the
Bankruptcy Act. The purpose of such a statute would be the achieve-
ment of a result indirectly which could not be achieved directly. There-
fore, this case should be viewed in the light of the existing facts and
the issues thereby raised from these facts.1 0 4
Viewing sequestration then in its modern context and with respect
to corporations, the Wisconsin Statute exceeds the two limitations which
surround the validity of a state statute. The first limitation is over-
stepped because Section 128.08 provides that sequestration is to be
brought only against corporations that are insolvent or are in imminent
danger of insolvency. The second limitation is transcended since Section
128.08 does not provide for the enforcement of liens.
B. Sequestration of Individual Debtor's Property
In so far as the individual debtor is concerned, the same objection
can be raised against the provisions that was raised when considering
sequestration of corporate property. 0 5 The remonstration to the pro-
visions is based on the ground that they do not provide for the enforce-
ment of liens. Under Section 128.08(1) (a), there does not have to be
an existing lien on the property for the benefit of the petitioning creditor
in order for him to proceed against the debtor. All the creditor needs is
to have an execution returned unsatisfied. The return of an execution
unsatisfied in effect means that the sheriff could not find any property
102 In re Schwartz Bros., supra note 18, at 763.
103 Id. at 764.
104 The decision in this case is criticized in 30 MINN. L. REv. 638, 640 (1946)
"[T]he court might well have found that this statute created powers in the
court beyond those inherent in a court of equity and held this to be an
insolvency statute suspended by the national bankruptcy act."205 A Maine Statute providing for an involuntary proceeding against an in-
solvent individual debtor was held to be an insolvency law. Littlefield v. Gay,
96 Me. 422, 52 At]. 925 (1902). Note that under Section 128.08 (1959) the
proceeding is also against an insolvent debtor. The debtor is insolvent be-
cause the ground upon which he is proceeded against is also the basis for
classification as an insolvent.
[Vol. 45
COMMENTS
on which to levy the execution. Even if the creditor had a lien on real
estate when the judgment was docketed, he would not be assured of
retaining it if he proceeded under Section 128.08.106 Further, not all of
the creditors participating in the proceeding are expected to have liens
prior to the operation of the section. There is definitely no lien created
for all the creditors by the mere appointment of a receiver. The Statute
is silent in that regard. Continuing along this line, to hold that the Statute
did give all the creditors liens would be to construe the Statute con-
trary to its express terms and purposes. In the order of distribution of
the property of the debtor, Section 128.17(f) provides for the payment
of debts entitled to priority before the payment of debts under Section
128.1 7 (g). Under the latter section, the property of the debtor is dis-
tributed to the "creditors generally, in proportion to the amount of their
claims, as allowed." [Emphasis supplied.] 10 7 Those creditors who have
valid liens prior to the proceeding under Chapter 128 will obtain
the satisfaction of them before the unsecured creditors have the op-
portunity to obtain any relief. In other words, the unsecured creditor
must present a claim which claim can be contested both as to its ex-
istence and as to its amount.
The fact that Chapter 128 provides for secured and unsecured
creditors implies that one type does not have a lien on the debtor's
property. Since some creditors will not have liens after the commence-
ment of a suit, it is not the purpose of Section 128.08 to create liens for
the creditors. Therefore, the provision for sequestration is not for the
purpose of the enforcement of liens. However, the purpose of this rem-
edy is to enable the court to seize the property of the debtor for the
ultimate purpose of administering it to secured and unsecured creditors.
Interwoven into the discussion of the creation of liens for unse-
cured creditors by the operation of Chapter 128 is the problem concern-
ing the invalidity of a statute which would give all unsecured creditors
liens. The purpose of such a statute viewed in the light of case law can
be conflicting with the Bankruptcy Act.'08 Applying this principle to the
106Under Section 128.13(3), a creditor who had obtained a lien within four
months of the proceeding under Chapter 128 will have it dissolved. There-
fore, if a secured creditor desires to retain his lien, he must wait four
months after he acquired it before he can take advantage of Section 128.03.
Note the similarity between Section 128.18(3) and Section 67(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act.
Under Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee in bankruptcyhas the powers of a lien creditor at the time of the filing of the petition.
However, Chapter 128 does not give the receiver the same powers as the
trustee in bankruptcy. Section 128.19 grants to the receiver the title of the
debtor's property. He also can avoid any transfer that any creditor could
have avoided. Yet, he is not in the same position as a lien creditor.
107 Wis STAT. §128.17(1) (g) (1959), created by Wis. LAws 1957, ch. 274, §6.
The classification of debtors according to whether or not they are secured
or unsecured is a significant feature of an insolvency law. 27 Miss. L. J.
230, 234 (1956).
108 In re Schwartz Bros., supra note 18, at 764.
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Wisconsin Statutes, it is obvious that even if all the creditors obtained
liens by the mere commencement of the proceedings and these liens
were enforced by giving each creditor a pro rata share, the statute would
be as comprehensive as the Bankruptcy Act. Thus, construing the Wis-
consin Statute in this fashion would still not overcome the objection
that it is insolvency legislation.
In conclusion, the purpose of sequestration under Section 128.08
goes beyond the meaning which has been well defined by the usage of
the remedy both at common law and in modern practice. As to corpora-
tions and as to individual debtors, the Wisconsin Legislature has pro-
vided a remedy that in no sense can operate to the extent that the Statute
purports it can. Therefore, the inclusion of the remedy of sequestration
does not rescue the Statute from being suspended by the Bankruptcy
Act. On the contrary, the manner in which sequestration is used in the
Statute becomes an additional reason for determining the Statute in-
valid.
The fact that sequestration and distribution cause a statute to be-
come insolvency legislation was discovered by Professor Williston
early after the turn of the century. 09 In a discussion of certain state
statutes, among them being a former Wisconsin Statute, Professor Wil-
liston reached this conclusion:
A particular form of statute is in force in a few States which
in certain instances operates as an involuntary transfer of the
debtor's property. . . . The state law as a punishment of the
debtor or redress to his creditors for an act which is contained
in all bankruptcy statutes as an act of bankruptcy, enforces the
very consequences which are provided for in the bankruptcy
act; namely, the sequestration and distribution of the debtor's
property. [Emphasis supplied.] 1 o
The Professor continued his analysis by saying that these statutes are
suspended by the Bankruptcy Act. His reasoning when applied to the
present Wisconsin Statute certainly shall yield the same result since this
Statute provides for both sequestration and distribution of the debtor's
property.
SEPARATION OF THE INVALID FROM THE VALID PROVISIONS
The determination in the foregoing discussion that there are certain
provisions in Chapter 128 that are insolvency legislation suggests the
necessity of altering the Chapter for the purpose of having it be in
harmony with the Bankruptcy Act. Without being presumptuous and
for the purposes of the following discussion, it is postulated that Section
128.08 together with the other provisions in the Chapter upon which it is
dependent are the insolvency provisions. Applying the rules of statutory
109 Williston, The Effect of a National Bankruptcy Law Upon State Laws,
22 HARV. L. REv. 547 (1909).
110 Id. at 560.
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construction in regard to the invalid provisions poses no insurmount-
able obstacles. On the other hand, close attention must be paid to these
rules if an effective method of amending the Chapter is desired. If
there is a possibility to sever the invalid provisions from the valid pro-
visions, this alteration must be considered. However, if the invalid
provisions are so interrelated with the valid ones that they cannot be
eliminated without destroying the efficacy of the remaining sections, the
entire Chapter falls."' These questions are resolved by the application
of the rules of construction, which are derived from the interpretation
of the statute, and from the discovery of the legislative intent.
Considering Chapter 128, the general purpose of it is to regulate
voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors. The Chapter is not
insolvency legislation to the extent it provides for this purpose. To
eliminate the invalid provisions would not hinder the operation of the
Chapter in this regard if the invalid provisions can be considered to
have a dual character. That is, can the same sections which are invalid
when a proceeding is commenced under Section 128.08 be considered
valid when a proceeding is brought under Section 128.01.
The source of the invalidity of the sections in Chapter 128 is Section
128.08. The other invalid sections become invalid because Section 128.08
makes reference to them and is interrelated with them. However, the
same sections which Section 128.08 incorporates are the sections which
Section 128.01 needs in order for it to operate. Therefore, the pro-
visions which Section 128.08 is dependent upon are the same provisions
upon which Section 128.01 is dependent. Consequently, these incor-
porated sections serve a dual purpose; namely, they facilitate voluntary
assignments for the benefit of creditors and expediate involuntary pro-
ceedings.
It must be further noted that Section 128.01 is not dependent upon
Section 128.08 since both sections provide for the commencement of two
different suits. A proceeding under Section 128.01 and the sections
which it incorporates affords a complete remedy. In other words, credit-*
ors need not resort to Section 128.08 in order to have a voluntary as-
signment.
Drawing these conclusions together, the invalid provisions of Chap-
ter 128 can be severed from the valid provisions without destroying
the efficacy of the latter. The severance can be performed by merely
eliminating Section 128.08 because that section is the source of the in-
validity of the other invalid sections.
The Wisconsin Legislature has provided the legal machinery whereby
the insolvency provisions can be extirpated from the valid ones:
Construction of Laws; rules for. In construing Wisconsin laws
the following rules shall be observed unless construction in ac-
M In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., supra note 2, at 656.
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cordance with a rule would produce a result inconsistent with
the manifest intention of the legislature :112
Severability. The provisions of the statutes are severable. The
provisions of any session law are severable. If any provision of
the statutes or of a session law is invalid or if the application
of either to any person or circumstance is invalid, such invalidity
shall not affect other provisions or applications which can be given
effect without the invalid provisions or application.1 : 3
In conclusion, Chapter 128 lends itself to severability and severance
can be accomplished by applying the above statutory provisions.
Since the invalid provisions of Chapter 128 can be deleted, it is
recommended that Section 128.08 be repealed. Notwithstanding the
rights granted to the creditors under this section are invalid, the Legisla-
ture would undoubtedly desire to retain some control over this area of
the debtor-creditor relationship. Supplementary to the criticism of Chap-
ter 128 is a recommendation that the Legislature afford the creditors
with a different remedy. A substituted remedy must, however, be in
keeping with the powers of the Legislature. To define the limits of legis-
lative authority would be to harp back to the tests which have been
formulated by the courts. The Wisconsin Legislature, therefore, must
follow the boundaries which the courts have prescribed in the applica-
tion of the tests to specific statutes.
THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE STATUTE
Aside from the theoretical reasoning that determines the doubtful
provisions of the Wisconsin Statute suspended, these provisions can be
criticized from the harsh consequences that flow from the operation of
the invalid provisions. Although not legally controlling, these significant
practical effects must be considered in determining the merits of the
Statute.
The operation of this Statute places the individual debtor and the
corporation in a most unfavorable position with respect to the debtor-
creditor relationship. Hypothetically, a large corporation which is found
to be insolvent by a small claim creditor is subject to the purview of the
Statute. For instance, if the corporation is insolvent, although only tem-
porarily, and owes a creditor only one dollar, it can have all of its assets
sequestrated by the court upon the petition of this creditor. This action
by the creditor would tie up the operations of the business. But more
disastrous is that upon the insistence of this creditor, the entire cor-
poration will have its assets distributed to all of the remaining creditors.
This hypothetical situation becomes more realistic when viewed in
the stringent world of business where corporations are vieing with both
112 WIS. STAT. §990.001 (1959).
113 WIS. STAT. §990.001(11) (1959).
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their creditors and their competitors. The drafters of the Bankruptcy
Act realized that unless certain safeguards were given the corporation
and the individual debtor the above example would not be merely aca-
demic. Consequently, they provided that no involuntary proceeding was
available to the creditor unless the corporation or the individual debtor
committed an act of bankruptcy. In addition to an act, there had to be
three creditors who have debts totaling $500 or more,1 14 and the debtor
has to owe debts to the amount of $1,000 or over.11 5 Even the former
Wisconsin Statute, which was considered invalid, contained precautions.
Considering the limitations under the Bankruptcy Act which affords the
corporation at least with some protection and comparing it with the un-
limited and unqualified involuntary proceeding under Section 128.08
certainly is cause for alarm.
The individual debtor is also placed in the same precarious position
as the corporation. In addition, the remedy afforded by Section 128.08
is not complete since it does not discharge the debtor from his liabilities.
In contrast to the corporation which is in effect discharged when it has
its assets administered, a debtor who has his estate distributed among
his creditors still owes the remaining debt. In order to relieve himself
of the existing obligations he will naturally file a petition in bankruptcy.
If the Statute be valid and the four month period has not passed, the
remedy under Section 128.08 becomes inefficient since now the property
has to be transferred from the state receiver to the trustee in bankruptcy.
If the debtor is still in receivership or the property has been admin-
istered, this procedure results in a loss of time. The value of the prop-
erty during the transition from the receiver to the trustee will probably
decrease. The creditors are now placed in another unfavorable position.
They will have to pay an additional fee to the trustee and will have to
suffer the loss of the property devaluation.
These policy factors against the wisdom of Section 128.08 can also
be considered in the theoretical arguments against the validity of the
Statute. The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to provide uniformity
in this area of the debtor-creditor relationship. 1 6 However, this Statute
provides for a conflicting remedy which competes with the Bankruptcy
Act and which frustrates the purpose of the latter. This argument is
bolstered by the principle that a state statute cannot afford the creditor
a choice between a state statute and the Bankruptcy Act. Considering this
principle, if the creditor desires to sequestrate the property of the
debtor and have it distributed among the other creditors he is con-
fronted with a choice of proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act or under
Section 128.08.
114 The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §59(b) (1958).
15 The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §4(b) (1958).




The application of the legal structure and its various tests explained
earlier synthesizes the various proposals of the challenge to the validity
of certain sections of Chapter 128. Previous discussion revealed that
unlike the sections regulating voluntary assignments for the benefit of
creditors, Section 128.08 and related sections are not part of the com-
mon law. Also fitting underneath this criterion was the determination
that sequestration and receivership as provided by Section 128.08 go
beyond the traditional meaning they had in historical usage and have in
modern practice. The object sought and the end attained by the doubtful
provisions of the Wisconsin Statute are the same in effect as those of
the bankruptcy court. This fact was proved by showing that the object
and the end of Section 128.08 and related sections are the distribution
of the estate of the individual debtor and the winding up of the affairs
of the corporation. These two objects and ends are the same in effect as
that of the Bankruptcy Act. A more descriptive criterion elucidated in
the foregoing material was the involuntary proceeding test. It was shown
that the Wisconsin Statute provides for a proceeding contrary to the
debtor's volition whereby the property of the debtor is administered
amongst the creditors. Comparing the invalid Statute of 1951 with the
present Statute revealed that both cover the same subject matter cov-
ered by the Bankruptcy Act. The standard which determines that the
state law contains the essential elements of an insolvency was found to
apply to the Wisconsin Statute; namely, the property of the debtor is
sequestrated and then is distributed to the creditors. Other subsidiary
tests were demonstrated, and, although not theoretically controlling, the
Statute was criticized from the standpoint of its wisdom.
The application of any one of the tests is sufficient to conclusively
determine the Wisconsin Statute an insolvency law. But since it is
salient that the Statute is in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act, the other
judicial tests became applicable. This latter fact emphasizes and sub-
stantiates the position that Section 128.08 and related sections constitute
insolvency legislation. Following from this conclusion was the recom-
mendation that only Section 128.08 needs to be repealed because Chapter
128 can be severed.
CONCLUSION
The hyperbole of opening Pandora's Box accurately describes the
situation in which one is placed in challenging the validity of certain
provisions of Chapter 128. Yet despite the sundry issues which fly out
of the Box, none of them are particularly unique or novel. Each one
is resolved by simply applying the principles which have been delineated
by judicial decisions. Be that as it may, proceedings under Section
128.08 are still being instituted because no judicial determination of
these sections has been made. Regardless of the difficulties in predicting
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the fate of the Wisconsin Statute, it must be considered because the
rights of both creditors and debtors will be affected by any judicial
challenge or by any legislative change.
Generally, there are five possibilities that could occur which would
influence the existence of the Wisconsin Statute. Weighing these five
possibilities, however, only one enters into the realm of actually occur-
ring. The remotest possibility is that Congress will repeal the Bank-
ruptcy Act which would thereby eliminate any question of the validity
of the Statute. A more feasible, but nonetheless distant, occurrence is
that no court will ever pass upon the Wisconsin Statute. Thus, the cloud
of doubt which surrounds this law will never disappear. However, with
the ever increasing amount of litigation in this field, this possibility
cannot be seriously considered. Sooner or later, a trustee in bankruptcy,
or another interested party who is adversely affected by the operation of
this Statute, will contend that it is suspended.
More feasible than the prior two contingencies is that the Wisconsin
Legislature will change Chapter 128 by repealing Section 128.08. The
happening of this event is dependent upon the statutory policy of the
Wisconsin Legislature. If the Legislature considers the Statute an in-
solvency law and desires to avoid having it so pronounced by a court,
it will undoubtedly repeal it. On the other hand, if the policy of the
Legislature is to retain on their books laws regulating the debtor-
creditor relationship regardless of their doubtful validity, no legislative
action will be taken. Judging from the fact that the invalid provisions
of the 1951 Statute remained on the books since 1937, it would be
reasonable to conclude that the latter policy is the one which the Wis-
consin Legislature will follow.
The previous discussion indicated that a court will pass upon the
Wisconsin Statute. A determination by a court will, of course, have
two possible outcomes; either the Statute is considered valid or it is
considered insolvency legislation. Viewing these two possibilities to-
gether, the most probable course of action will be that the Statute will
be determined insolvency legislation. This possibility is predicated on
the fact that it is more reasonable to conclude that the Statute is in-
solvency legislation than it is to conclude that it is valid. In viewing the
Statute, a court can apply any one of a myriad of tests in order to find
the law suspended. However, if the Statute is held valid, a court will
have to overrule the long list of tests which have been carefully formu-
lated. Another manner in which the Statute could be saved is if a court
would distinguish the Wisconsin provisions from the provisions of other
state statutes which were considered invalid. However, it is difficult to
visualize that plausible distinctions exist.
The legal hazards which surround Section 128.08 and related sec-
tions can be effectively eliminated by judicial determination and then
1961-621
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by legislative amendment. But during the interim, persons relying on
this Statute must be aware that they are placing themselves in a very
vulnerable position.
THOMAS W. BERTZ
